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Abstract
The revelations of PRISM and XKeyscore by ex-National Security Agency (NSA)
analyst Edward Snowden resulted in arguably the largest intelligence leak so far in the
21st century. The leak revealed that the NSA was working with the British Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) on surveillance and data collection of individuals
throughout Europe. Similarly, the NSA also colluded with the German Federal Intelligence
Service (BND) on similar data collection and surveillance activities. Whereas the British
government reacted relatively benignly to the revelations despite cries of government abuse,
the German government reacted negatively to the revelations, eventually opening a rift between Washington and Berlin. This paper examines the reactions to and the immediate political consequences of the Snowden revelations within the United Kingdom and Germany.
By comparing and contrasting the two cases, one can determine whether the United States
unnecessarily antagonized the Germans or if larger forces were at work.
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One year after Edward Snowden first leaked information surrounding the United
States National Security Agency’s (NSA) data collection programs, German authorities arrested an employee of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Germany’s foreign
intelligence and security service, on the charge of conducting espionage on behalf of the
United States (Larimer, 2014). The episode sparked wide domestic rebuke of American
intelligence activities within Germany. One week later, broadcaster Deutsche Welle aired
an episode of international talk show Quadriga that discussed the growing political divide
between the United States and Germany over espionage and intelligence gathering. The
arrest was only the latest in a string of espionage exposés regarding American intelligence
gathering within Germany, all of which contributed to growing anti-American sentiment
amongst both German politicians and public alike. Referring to German political outrage against the United States over the discovered agent, Tom Goeller, former German
correspondent for the Washington Times, said “[the] problem is very simple: the German
nation, the public wasn’t aware, they didn’t know. But the politicians knew, the diplomats
knew, and this is why I do not understand the outrage of German politicians” (Goeller,
2014). Expectedly, the public reacted negatively to the spy, but the German officials’
sharp condemnation of what seemed a common and expected act of espionage illuminated a long saga of political toxicity regarding American intelligence gathering within the
Germany, regardless of whether the German government itself was implicated in some of
those activities.
Germany was not the only state involved in the initial surveillance revelations. Other
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, including the United Kingdom
and France, were also subject data-gathering and surveillance programs run by the NSA.
Government intelligence agencies within both the United Kingdom and Germany were
complicit in NSA data-gathering and surveillance activities on their respective homelands.
As James Igoe Walsh aptly notes, the “sharing of intelligence between national governments is at the centre of their attempts to cooperate on contemporary problems such as
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and stopping the activities of
terrorist groups and drug traffickers” (Walsh, 2007, p. 151). Therefore it seems reasonable
that the German and British governments would willingly work together with the United
States on intelligence gathering in order to curtail threats.
However, once the information was leaked, the political responses from both
countries’ governments differed greatly: while the British government accepted complicity and defended the programs, the German government denied complicity and eventually attacked the programs. Hence, a conundrum arises: an explanation must exist to
explain why despite German and British intelligence agencies’ enthusiastic compliance
with American intelligence, the former’s government condemned the United States for
conducting those operations once they were revealed, whereas the latter did not. This
paper delves into this dilemma by outlining the background surrounding British-American
and German-American intelligence relationships and analyzing the political effects to those
relationships post-Snowden. A comparison of these two analyses will hopefully illuminate
whether there are lessons to be learned regarding intelligence gathering and surveillance
within allied states. It will also seek to answer whether the United States should take the
supposed strain on American-German relations seriously or if this is a case of one eagle attempting to scare another from the former’s nest.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/8
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Building the Snowpack
To provide a reference point with which one may compare the German-American
intelligence relationship to, there is none better than to compare than the British-American intelligence relationship. The British-American intelligence partnership dates back to
the World War I era, but an explicit partnership was established post-World War II and
continues to the present day, making it the most stable bilateral intelligence partnership in
history. The relationship is also well-documented, making it a rarity among intelligence
partnerships, as the very nature of such partnerships precludes secrecy. Intelligence, as
used here, is defined as “linked to the production and dissemination of information” and
“performed by officers of the state for state purposes” (Warner, 2002, p. 21). Specifically,
it is important to look at signals intelligence (SIGINT) collaboration, as SIGINT is most
identified with communications, data collection, and data surveillance, and the agencies
responsible for SIGINT, the NSA and the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), are the two agencies that are at the center of the Snowden
leaks.
The NSA and GCHQ began their formal partnership after their two respective states
forged the United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (UKUSA), the first
framework sanctioning official communications intelligence exchange approved on March
5, 1946 (United States Government; United Kingdom Government, 1946). The agreement allowed for free exchange of foreign communications between the two nations,
which in turn meant that the two nations also shared decryption tools and processes (Aldrich, 2001, p. 246). Once the NSA was created by President Harry Truman, it became
the go-to agency for American SIGINT, working together closely with GCHQ to monitor the Soviet Union (Aldrich, 2010, p. 104). UKUSA was later expanded to include the
participation of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand during the early years of the Cold
War, forming the intelligence-sharing network known as the Five Eyes (The National
Archives, 2010).
GCHQ and the NSA continued to work intimately on various projects into the
twenty-first century, many of which were revealed by Snowden. The two agencies fought
privacy measures such as public key encryption in order to maintain a strong surveillance
presence into the Internet age (Aldrich, 2010, p. 489). Despite losing that battle, the two
agencies found ways of circumventing the encryption problem through backdoor channels on software with the cooperation of private firms (Ball, 2013). GCHQ also operated
a project known as “Mastering the Internet” which involved a subproject called Tempora, involving intercepting data as it entered England through fiber-optic cables running
underwater at areas such as Cornwall. GCHQ analyzed the data collected here and also
passed on information to NSA for analysis (MacAskill, Borger, Hopkins, Davies, & Ball,
2013). Monetary support between the United States and the United Kingdom also occurred; from 2010 to 2013, the United States government paid at minimum 100 million
pounds to the British government with the intent to modernize and expand GCHQ’s data
collection capabilities (Hopkins & Borger, 2013). These are but some of the many instances that show how close the GCHQ-NSA relationship, and by extension, the BritishAmerican intelligence relationship remains. Similar instances could be also found between
the BND and American intelligence agencies.
The BND and the NSA share a hierarchical relationship, often characterized as one
After the Avalanche

92

Jobel Kyle P. Vecino University of California, Berkeley

between a younger sibling and an older sibling (Livingston, 2014). During the early stages
of the Cold War, the Western Allied-controlled portion of Germany was on the frontline.
Due to the increase of possible hostilities between the former Allies, the land that would
become West Germany became pivotal for signals intelligence collection to monitor
Soviet movements. To this end, former German Army intelligence chief Reinhard Gehlen
formed the Gehlen Organization under the supervision of the United States Army, effectively creating a German intelligence apparatus under the umbrella of the American military (Walsh, 2007, p. 169). As the intelligence provided to the Americans from the Gehlen
organization seemed invaluable, when the time came to divide Germany into two states,
the United States continued to control the Gehlen Organization through the American
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Walsh, 2007, p. 169). The Gehlen Organization
would evolve into the BND. In 1962, the BND established a formal SIGINT relationship
with the NSA (National Security Agency, 2013). By this time, the BND was autonomous
but continued to remain effectively tied to, though not necessarily overseen, by American
intelligence agencies.
The elder-sibling/younger-sibling dynamic continued well into the twenty-first
century, where technological advancements and proximity to the Middle East increased
the prestige of German signals intelligence operations and made German intelligence a
particular boon for counterterrorism measures, but the general hierarchical framework
persisted. After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States and Germany
signed an intelligence sharing agreement that would have the United States provide contact information and other data for German foreign intelligence to use for targeting purposes (Gude, et al., 2014). The agreement specifically allowed the United States to analyze
data and signals being received by the Bad Aibling listening post in Bavaria (Gude, et al.,
2014). The station, which was originally built by the NSA as a listening post and held
under joint NSA-BND control for years, was eventually transferred to full BND control,
but the NSA retained a permanent staff on location (Gude, et al., 2014). The NSA-BND
partnership itself would become solidified as the Joint SIGINT Activity (JSA) (National
Security Agency, 2007/2008). In addition, the NSA also provided the Federal Office for
the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV), the German
domestic intelligence office, with the intelligence analysis program XKeyscore (Gude, et
al., 2014). On the whole, the partnership seemed very warm. To quote one internal NSA
information paper from 2013, “[In] the past year, Germany displayed both eagerness and
self-sufficiency in transforming its SIGINT activities and assumed greater risk in support
of U.S. intelligence needs and efforts to improve information sharing within the German
government, with coalition partners, and NSA” (National Security Agency, 2013). This
statement shows that the Americans recognized an eagerness for German involvement
with NSA SIGINT efforts.
What both these stories illustrate is that British signals intelligence and German foreign and domestic intelligence held very strong partnerships with the NSA. Both GCHQ
and the BND have a history of partnership that dates back decades and that the NSA had
particularly strong influence in the operation of both agencies. Considering the ensuing
political aftermath of the Snowden leaks, both agencies’ respective governments would
fight tooth and nail to defend their past actions, particularly as they both retained ultimate
oversight over those agencies. Surprisingly, that was not what happened.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/8
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Watching the Snowslip
The leaks first became public in early June 2013, early on implicating and enraging the British government. One day after the leaks, the British newspaper The Guardian
published an article claiming that GCHQ was collecting intelligence from large Internet
firms through the NSA-built PRISM program. GCHQ refused to comment regarding the
program. In the following weeks, The Guardian and The Washington Post continued publishing information about the joint surveillance and data collection activities, prompting
the British government to contact The Guardian to request that the leaks stop (Van Sickle,
2014). The government’s response soon turned indignant. British Prime Minister David
Cameron remarked that what “Snowden is doing and to an extent what the newspapers
are doing in helping him is frankly signaling to people who mean to do us harm, how to
evade and avoid intelligence and surveillance and other techniques” (Hope & Waterfield,
2013). A member of British parliament called for the editor of The Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, to face criminal prosecution over publishing the leaks (Mason, 2013). It was quite
clear that the British government would not back down on its defense of the programs.
On the continent, the BND became implicated once the German newsmagazine
Der Spiegel got hold of documents pertaining to German-American intelligence liaison.
One month after the initial leaks Der Spiegel published articles claiming that the BND
conducted surveillance and data collection on behalf of the NSA, sending data on German
residents to the Americans (Gude, et al., 2014). The files obtained by Snowden were then
released for public download by Der Spiegel, fueling the growing fire of blame underneath the Chancellery, as it maintains oversight and responsibility over the nation’s federal
intelligence agencies. The leader of the German parliamentary opposition at the time, the
Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) Peer Steinbrück accused Chancellor Angela Merkel and
the incumbent government of blatantly lying to the public, stating that the “latest media
reports about the close relationship between German and American intelligence services
confirm the impression that the German government either feigned ignorance, kept quiet
about its complicity or that the intelligence agencies have gotten out of control” (Medick,
2013). Accusations of the government watering down German basic law followed, with
constitutional experts questioning the legality of the Chancellery’s complicity (Gude, et
al., 2014).
For its part, the German government remained relatively quiet about the leaks,
claiming nescience before being exposed. Before the leaks shed light on German intelligence involvement, the incumbent government made claims that the revealed programs
were only being discovered through news coverage. Despite claims of possible German
involvement in the NSA’s PRISM program, the official government response remained
reserved. Merkel kept a neutral public attitude regarding the leaks, refusing to comment
until a review of PRISM was completed by the United States, while affirming German
sovereignty (Der Spiegel, 2013). Once Der Spiegel published the documents Snowden
leaked pertaining to Germany, criticism against the government mounted. Around the
same time, high-ranking German intelligence officials received legal affirmation from both
GCHQ and the NSA that neither organization had acted illegally according to established
agreements between Germany and the organizations’ respective countries (Gude, Von
Hammerstein, Hesse, Rosenbach, & Schindler, 2013). With the affirmation of legality,
it became accepted that the BND was responsible for the bulk data collection (most of
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which was claimed to originate from Afghanistan), and that appeared to be that.
However, the situation did not go away, and the German government’s attitude
became increasingly anti-American. Der Spiegel conducted further analysis of the leaked
NSA documents, finding that Merkel’s cell phone calls were actively intercepted (Appelbaum, et al., 2013). A parliamentary probe was established to investigate the extent of
the NSA leaks (The Local, 2014). A federal investigation was opened up over the NSA
(Gude, Schindler, & Schmid, Merkel’s Mobile: Germany Launches Investigation into
NSA Spying, 2014). Compounding the wiretapping issue was the discovery and arrest of
an American mole within the BND. One year after the first published leaks, the German
government demanded the expulsion of the CIA Berlin station chief (Miller & Kirchner,
2014). The Washington-Berlin relationship became increasingly tepid.
American officials understood the necessity of mollifying German unease both
in public and in the German government to varying success. During President Barack
Obama’s first speech in Berlin following the Snowden leaks, he dedicated a section of the
speech assuring the German public that the revealed intelligence gathering and analysis
programs were bound by “the rule of law, and they’re focused on threats to our security –
not the communications of ordinary persons” (The White House, 2013). Once allegations
of eavesdropping on Merkel’s phone calls were confirmed, Secretary of State John Kerry
made a diversion during a trip to Munich to personally meet with Merkel and German
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier regarding collaboration issues (Schmitz & Gebauer, 2014). Before Merkel’s visit to the United States in April 2014, Obama and Merkel
publicly stated that they wished to create a “structured dialogue” which Kerry opened the
door to during his visit (Blome, Schmitz, & Stark, 2014). However, tensions once again
rose once the American BND mole was arrested, and the United States bowed to Germany’s order to relieve its Berlin CIA chief.
Digging a Snowpit
The depth and warmth of the British-American and German-American relationships
have now been established, as well as each nation’s respective SIGINT organization’s complicity in NSA programs revealed by Snowden, therefore leaving open the question of why
both governments’ responses seemed so contrary. There are several plausible explanations
as to why the German government reacted very differently than the British government did
after the leaks. As internal information regarding precise attitudes within the German government remains inaccessible and will likely remain so into the near future, one should not
be surprised that the veracity of the following explanations cannot be officially confirmed.
However, some or even all of these factors could contribute to an answer and therefore
should be considered carefully. The following two sections will focus on political analyses
on the individual, domestic, and international level to explain as fully as possible the disparity between the British and German reactions.
A historical perspective is important to consider particularly when analyzing the
evolution in Merkel’s political responses to the leaks. After World War II was over and
the German state was separated, West Germany maintained the BfV and BND as their primary intelligence and security organizations while East Germany had the Stasi. The Stasi
were well known for their mass surveillance and brutal methods, leaving a lasting legacy
on the German public, particularly on former East Germans such as Merkel (Chambers,
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/8
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2009). Merkel’s own father operated a seminary, many of which were infiltrated by the
Stasi to monitor non-communist teachings, and Merkel herself refused to inform on behalf
of the Stasi while she was seeking a teaching position in her younger years (Crawford &
Czuczka, 2013). Such past experiences may have made her more amenable to attacking
the American position on their intelligence gathering activities once it was discovered
that she was personally targeted. The evidence for this interpretation revolves around the
change in tone of the Chancellery’s message regarding American surveillance activities
before and after it was made clear that Merkel’s phone calls were listened in to. Of course,
similar experiences also likely influenced German public opinion against the United States
when the extent of the NSA’s operations became known – which allowed Merkel’s political rivals to attack her and her party in the 2013 German federal election.
Domestically, it would be fairly easy for an opposition party to criticize an incumbent government of sacrificing their citizens’ privacy and human rights to some foreign
menace (in this case, the Americans). Concurrent to the time of the Snowden leaks,
Germany underwent a general election campaign fought primarily between Merkel’s
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the opposition SPD. When the leaks came out,
the SPD jumped at the opportunity to criticize Merkel, due to the Chancellery being the
body that supervises the intelligence services. The CDU fired back, citing that the SPD
was in power during the time the first intelligence sharing agreements were forged in
2002, and that the SPD was also in power during Merkel’s first term as Chancellor (Gude,
Von Hammstein, Muller, & Schinder, 2013). However, many of the documents leaked
by Snowden recount the relationship between the BND and the NSA during Merkel’s
tenure, allowing one to reasonably argue that she was more responsible than her SPD
counterparts (National Security Agency, 2013). The strict stance against the United States
occurred after the general election, during which Merkel formed a coalition with her
political rivals, the SPD, giving them the foreign policy portfolio as well. The Chancellery then undertook a tougher stance on American surveillance and espionage, especially
after Der Spiegel found that Merkel’s phone calls were intercepted. The coalition government also called for the expulsion of the Berlin CIA station chief after arresting an alleged
American mole within the BND (Miller & Kirchner, 2014).
Such a scenario involving attacks on government complicity was not possible in
the United Kingdom. By the 2013, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was
in power for three years, before which the Labour Party, the leading opposition party,
was in power for the previous 13 years. This meant that the three largest British political parties were all in some way in power during the time period during which the
programs revealed by Snowden were in place. For example, the presentations regarding
PRISM include references to the program’s use back to 2007, during which time Labour’s
Gordon Brown held an absolute majority in Parliament (PRISM Collection Manager,
2013). Granted, after the Conservative coalition came into power in 2010, there seems
to have been a shift in focus toward GCHQ activities, shown by government acceptance
of American funds for expanding GCHQ’s capabilities, possibly signaling greater government support over the surveillance and data collection activities enacted by the NSA and
GCHQ.
On the international level of analysis, Germany’s reactions may be symptomatic of
a greater power shift. Walsh argues that in the traditional framework of the international
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state system, despite an anarchic international order, hierarchical intelligence sharing relationships could be formed if the gains were great enough (Walsh, 2007, p. 177). Also, due
to the inherent power dynamics of such a relationship, one can easily determine which the
greater power is and which is the lesser based on their position in an intelligence-sharing
relationship. Walsh claims that both Germany and the United Kingdom participate as subordinate partners to the United States with regards to intelligence sharing (Walsh, 2007,
p. 178). Though his analysis is of relationships from the early Cold War, one can easily
see parallels today – GCHQ’s funding by the NSA echoes American funding efforts post
World War II, while the NSA’s construction and joint operation of the Bad Aibling station with the BND retains hallmarks of the time the CIA managed the BND’s predecessor. One caveat is that the United Kingdom’s relationship with the United States may also
be considered more anarchic (or less hierarchical), due to UKUSA allowing either state to
withhold certain information from the other assuming the latter agrees to nondisclosure
(Aldrich, 2001, p. 247; Walsh, 2007, p. 178). Either way, the German-American intelligence relationship is undoubtedly hierarchic.
Under this interpretation, Germany’s decision to defect from the agreement may
indicate that the German state no longer sees itself as belonging within a hierarchical
relationship with the United States. Evidence for German defiance of American-backed
policy post-Cold War is well known, including overtures for trade agreements with China
against American wishes as well as the previously mentioned actions the Germans took
against American intelligence interests (Kundnani, 2014). These actions come at a time
where Germany is becoming increasingly seen as the leader of the European Union and
one of the world’s foremost rising powers (Kundnani, 2014); therefore it seems very likely
according to liberal institutional theory that Germany no longer sees adequate payoffs
from a hierarchical relationship. In contrast, the United Kingdom declined internationally
since World War II, with the forfeiture of several of its colonial possessions. In relation to
the United States, the United Kingdom took on the role characterized as a partner past
its prime. Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once quipped that “These
Americans represent the new Roman Empire and we Britons, like the Greeks of old, must
teach them how to make it go” (Hitchens, 1990, p. 23).
Prima facie the domestic analysis of the situation comes across as the most compelling. Certainly, it is clear that domestic motivations were on the mind of government
officials, particularly Merkel and her fellow CDU members who were up for reelection
and required the opposition SPD to form a government post-election. Posing in a more
anti-American stance during this time could be construed as cut-and-dry political strategy.
However, the international level analysis of the situation may bear more interesting insight
into what might be a marked change in American-German relations. Merkel transferred
the foreign policy portfolio within her new coalition government to the SPD, granting
the party that most criticized the intelligence-sharing policy of the previous government
influence over policy in that sector. Furthermore, by continuing to hammer the American
government and with the resulting American retreat in some intelligence activities, Germany looks more equal with the United States, at least in public perception. These subtle
shifts do suggest that optic-wise, Germany began to show itself successfully defecting from
a hierarchical relationship with the United States, and the United States acknowledging
that the relationship was now less hierarchic.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/8
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Withstanding the Snowstorm
At the very least, the German public’s reaction is understandable considering the lack
of public consent regarding the activities conducted on them. Former GCHQ head David
Omand wrote that in some sense the public must maintain confidence in the intelligence
activities conducted upon them by their government, as these activities are conducted on
behalf of the individual as well as the state (Omand, 2010, p. 262). It would be a different
matter if the United States unilaterally conducting espionage and data gathering activities
(which it did), but the matter at hand concerns the German government’s willingness to
enter into the data surveillance relationship without legislative review. Such reviews and accountability structures, however effective, do exist in the United Kingdom (Omand, 2010,
p. 267). Therefore, one could say that in the British case the subjects of the state had their
say through their representatives. The nature of this issue within Germany is sadly dubious
without official government records; the Chancellery could have lacked proper control over
its agencies or it could have been aware of the programs and simply chose not to inform the
appropriate legislative bodies. Regardless, because some of the domestic political pressure
against the aforementioned activities, the United States should accept the necessity of some
of the German government’s moves decrying American intelligence activities.
For the United States, several courses of action remain available. Regarding repairing
German-American relations, it may be prudent to once again offer Germany membership
within the Five Eyes or negotiate another, relatively more equitable intelligence-sharing
agreement. Such a status could appease any German sentiment surrounding escaping the hierarchical intelligence relationship, and would allow the United States full access to German
foreign SIGINT. The Obama administration rebuked a similar request from Merkel in the
past while Merkel rebuked offers made to her (Donahue & Walcott, 2014), but stances can
change and domestic American support for such a decision does exist (Passenheim, 2013).
Another choice would simply be to wait out the political damage before resuming operations at as large of a scale pre-Snowden. However, considering both German anger and
domestic pressure to reform or at least rein in American intelligence agencies, such a tactic
may cost significant time and opportunities, depending on the value of the SIGINT obtained through BND liaison. Important to note however, is that whatever fuss the German
government formulated, affirmations of friendship continued, at least in public statements.
Considering the geopolitical situation at the time regarding the Russian seizure of Crimea
and the deterioration of the Ukrainian crisis, such affirmations would be political necessity
to counterbalance against a resurgent Russia.
At first, the lesson from the political fallout of the Snowden leaks and ensuing intelligence scandals seems to be that even intelligence activities, no matter how common or
well-intentioned, will meet resistance from friends as well. To avoid similar debacles with
allies in the future, the United States should examine the pretense of equality encapsulated
within UKUSA and determine whether in the future, the United States will benefit from
similar relationships with other states like Germany. Whether or not these relationships are
actually reformed remains a separate matter, but intelligence relationships should be constantly reevaluated to mirror the changing world. There may come a day where the United
States no longer maintains a dominant intelligence apparatus or reach or maybe that day will
never come, but to avoid being snowed in politically by future leaks, maintaining strong
political ties with intelligence partners should be imperative.
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